December 24, 2024: The recent rapid collapse of the Assad government in Syria was made possible by the Alawite ethnic group deserting their Alawite patron President Bashar Assad. For decades the Alawites had prospered by supporting the Assad family, but thirteen years of civil war had meant heavy losses for the Alawites and that was blamed on misrule by the Assads. The Assad family had ruled Syria since 1971 as a secular dictatorship. The Assads ruled a country that is over 80 percent Sunni. Sunnis do not get along with Shia and Alawites are considered a Shia sect.

The widespread outbreak of violence in 2011-2 was not unexpected, only the extent of the fighting and how the rebels were soon dominated by al Qaeda Islamic terrorists and in 2014 by an even more violent al Qaeda faction known as ISIL/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Since 2011 the Syrian revolt against Assad rule has left 500,000 Syrians dead, while seven million fled to neighboring countries and 13 million are internal refugees displaced inside Syria. These millions were driven from their homes and many have no place to stay.

The most recent ruler of Syria was Bashir Assad, a son of Hafez Assad who took control of the Syrian government 1971 and held onto that position until his death in 2000. He was succeeded by his son Bashir, who promised reforms. But while there was some more economic freedom, Syria remained a dictatorship dominated by the Assad family, the Alawite minority and the Baath Party. Bashir since demonstrated that he can be as brutal and ruthless as his father, whose signature repressive act was the 1982 destruction of a town held by Sunni Islamic radicals who challenged his rule. That attack crushed the Sunni opposition. Hafez Assad was not challenged for the remaining 18 years of his life, and he died in bed, with his son Bashir succeeding him, but that was a more tyrant-friendly time. The Arab Spring has made it clear that democracy is now the preferred method of governing. Bashir believed that old-school violence would crush any opposition and used the customary tools to apply lots of pain to millions of Syrians.

The police state, perfected by the 20th century communists, was designed to keep democrats, and other threats, from overturning a dictatorship. The Assads, and the Baath Party, learned from the Communist Russians, as did most other Arab dictators. Actually, many of the communist techniques were ancient like secret police, and informer networks. Arab tyrants had some ancient techniques like nepotism that the communists had tried to discard. However, communist and traditional police states still had a major weakness, poor economic performance. In the 21st century, with its pervasive media and social networking, that has become a fatal distraction. Dictators stay in power by being feared, not loved. But when the population grows angrier and angrier about their poverty and lack of opportunity, they develop something worth dying for.

Police states are now under more pressure from popular unrest, and Syria was a test of whether the traditional means of repression would continue to work. In economic terms, only about ten percent of the population benefit from a dictatorship. This fraction of the population supplies the manpower for the secret police, armed forces leadership and essential civilian leaders. In Syria that meant 50,000 full-time secret police, mostly Alawite, and whatever portion of the 300,000 active-duty military and 100,000 paramilitary forces constitute the leadership. A majority of the military and paramilitary were Sunni Arabs led by Alawite officers. The Alawites are five percent of the population. Sunni Arabs are about 75 percent. Other Shia, Druze and Christian minorities did, up to a point, side with the Alawites. This is a common pattern in the Middle East, where non-Sunni minorities have long been persecuted.

The Alawites feared retribution, and for good reason. The Alawites used terror to maintain power for decades. Most Syrians have good reason to hate the Alawites, as well as all those who have supported the government. While some of the protestors are minorities, most of them are Sunnis.

Al Qaeda, which is basically a radical Sunni group, tried to hijack the revolution without much success because there were several Islamic terrorist factions and they fought each other as often as they did the Assad government. For a decade the revolt against the Assads has failed to overthrow the Assads and has devastated Syria and caused enormous damage to Syria.

During this Syrian civil war, some 5.5 million Syrians fled to neighboring countries. Turkey received 3.6 million, Lebanon two million and Iraq 250,000. There are also several million Syrians in Saudi Arabia, who are considered part of the large expatriate workforce of over six million foreigners. About a third of those workers are Syrians. Several million Syrians also got into Europe. While many fled to Saudi Arabia because of the war in Syria, they were not treated like refugees and have jobs and status in Saudi Arabia. Countries bordering Syria want their refugees to go home. That could not happen without the cooperation of the Assad government. Syria needed a lot of those refugees to revive the economy.

The Assads survived during the last decade because of Iranian support, and Iranians are prone to strike back if betrayed. Iran could strike back by simply backing several opposition groups and further reducing support for the Assads. The Iranians are better at this sort of thing than Arabs and have demonstrated that for centuries. The Assads have survived for so long because they make realistic assessments of what their opponents can do and act accordingly. Since the 1970s the Assads have remained in power by choosing correctly whenever faced with a situation that could be a disaster if they make the wrong choice. At any moment, making the wrong decision could be the end of Assad rule in Syria. There is no obvious successor to the Assads. Because of that the Assads remained in power because the alternative could be a lot worse. That’s how the Assads survived the last decade of rebellion and civil war. In early December the Assad’s were suddenly gone because the better organized HTS faction struck while the Assads were weak and their Alawite supporters dissatisfied to the point of mutiny.

The deplorable state of the Syrian economy was and is a major problem for Syrians, the Assad regime and its HTS terrorist successor regime. The way to measure the state of the Syrian economy is the strength of the Syrian currency; lira (or pound). The exchange rate was 50 pounds to the dollar before the violence began in 2011. In late 2022 it was 5,000 pounds to the dollar, rose to 7,000 pounds in early 2023 and was nearly 10,000 pounds to the dollar before the recent HTS victory.

Average monthly income is under $200 and much of that comes from expatriates sending remittances. The loss of oil shipments from Iran was a major factor in the collapse of the economy. The change in exchange rates also reflects the failure of the Assads to make much progress in the last few years. Aid from Russia and Iran had kept the Assad government and the Syrian Air Force going. The loss of Russian and Iranian support over the last few years was catastrophic because no one else stepped up to replace that aid. All those setbacks played a major role in the demoralization of the Alawites and the Assads fleeing to Russia.